Given the generic canonical probability in phase φ=exp[β(Ψ-H)], contact is traditionally made with phenomenological thermodynamics by comparing the identity δ〈φ〉=0 with the relationTδS=δU+δW, δ indicating an arbitrary infinitesimal variation of the thermodynamic coordinates and angular brackets ensemble means. This paper is concerned with the inverse problem of finding both the generic form of the phase functionw such thatS=〈w〉 and the explicit form φ=αexp[(F-H)/kT] of the canonical distribution on the basis of the requirement that the consequences of the phenomenological laws must (...) be safeguarded, i.e., the relations between the quantities which are their concomitants must also be satisfied by their statistical representatives. Given the generic statistical formalism and specifically thatU=〈H〉, δW=−〈δH〉, the problem is soluble, granted the following generic assumption: “the statistical representative of the entropy is the ensemble mean of a function which depends upon the phase through φ alone.”. (shrink)

In describing the account of the εδη in the Phaedo, Burnet says, ‘they are explained in a peculiar vocabulary which is represented as that of a school. The technical terms are introduced by such formulas as “we say”’. Similarly Taylor has written of the ‘characteristic technical nomenclature’ used in the dialogues, of the ‘technicalities’ of the theory of εδη, of ‘the technical phrases of the Phaedo’ The validity of such language has been taken for granted by both these and many (...) other Platonic scholars. But the assumption which it represents—that Plato employed certain words in a significance peculiar to his use of them—carries such wide implications for the history and interpretation of his philosophy that it can hardly be accepted without further investigation. In this article I shall examine the evidence in fifth- and early fourth-century literature about these words which Plato or Socrates is alleged to have transformed into ‘technicalities’: first, εδος and δσ, which I shall assume to be more or less synonymous; second, the various terms used to describe the relation between εδη and particulars—,μετέχειν, κοινωνεν,παρεναι, νεναι,μιμησις,μοιωαις, and so on. (shrink)

In describing the account of the εδη in the Phaedo, Burnet says, ‘they are explained in a peculiar vocabulary which is represented as that of a school. The technical terms are introduced by such formulas as “we say”’. Similarly Taylor has written of the ‘characteristic technical nomenclature’ used in the dialogues, of the ‘technicalities’ of the theory of εδη, of ‘the technical phrases of the Phaedo’ The validity of such language has been taken for granted by both these and many (...) other Platonic scholars. But the assumption which it represents—that Plato employed certain words in a significance peculiar to his use of them—carries such wide implications for the history and interpretation of his philosophy that it can hardly be accepted without further investigation. In this article I shall examine the evidence in fifth- and early fourth-century literature about these words which Plato or Socrates is alleged to have transformed into ‘technicalities’: first, εδος and δσ, which I shall assume to be more or less synonymous; second, the various terms used to describe the relation between εδη and particulars—,μετέχειν, κοινωνεν,παρεναι, νεναι,μιμησις,μοιωαις, and so on. (shrink)

In Philosophy for April 1961 Mr J. R. Lucas argues that Gödel's theorem proves that Mechanism is false. I wish to dispute this view, not because I maintain that Mechanism is true, but because I do not believe that this issue is to be settled by what looks rather like a kind of logical conjuring-trick. In my discussion I take for granted Lucas's account of Gödel's procedure, which I am not competent to criticise.

Many pioneers of the Scientific Revolution such as Galileo, Kepler, Stevin, Descartes, Mersenne, and others, wrote extensively about musical theory. This was not a chance interest of a few individual scientists. Rather, it reflects a continuing concern of scientists from Pythagorean times onwards to solve certain quantifiable problems in musical theory. One of the issues involved was technically known as ‘the division of the octave’, the problem, that is, of which notes to make music with. Simon Stevin's contribution to this (...) issue, in his treatise Vande Spiegheling der Singconst , is usually conceived of as a remarkably early plea for equal temperament, which is the tuning system we nowadays all take for granted. In this paper I show that, even though it is true that Stevin calculated the figures for what is now known as equal temperament, in fact the subject of temperament has almost nothing to do with his accompanying considerations, and that, therefore, his calculations served another purpose. A careful analysis of the problem situation in the science of music around 1600, reveals that Stevin's treatise highlights a particular stage in the history of what has always been the core issue of the science of music, namely, the problem of consonance. This is the search for an explanation, on scientific principles, of Pythagoras' law: ‘Why is it that those few musical intervals which affect our ear in a sweet and pleasing manner, correspond to the ratios of the first few integers?’ Through an analysis of the source material available we find that Stevin's theory, which makes no sense if interpreted as an early stage in the ‘evolution’ of equal temperament, was meant as a solution—as freshly original as it was wrongheaded—to this perennial problem of consonance, which has continued to baffle some of the best scientific minds from the very beginning of science to the present day. (shrink)

This paper reviews and discusses empirical evidence from consciousness research, especially research into anomalies, and asks the question what, if taken seriously, would those data mean for our concepts of consciousness, science, and religion. It shows that the process of naturalization, i.e. finding scientific explanations for as yet badly understood phenomena, is not finished yet and could have a profound impact both on science and religion: traditional religious concepts would have to be reconsidered, and the scientistic materialist worldview that is (...) currently implicitly underpinning much of science would prove to be untenable. The empirical evidence, if accepted, demands a concept of consciousness that grants consciousness some fundamental status in the world, and the capacity to non-locally connect to events and other consciousnesses. This would seem to preclude a materialist concept of science, as well as some fundamentalist concepts of religion. It would continue the process of naturalizing religion into some as yet uncharted territory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:702 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER t99 5 appears more as an anomalous figure in the spirit of Kierkegaard than a thinker of the mainstream. For Jaspers, philosophy is a vehicle to provoke a spiritual sense of the wonder of existence rather than an autonomous vocation which strives to recast its questions in increasingly radical ways. Most typically, Jaspers's emphasis on darker aspects of the human (...) predicament--guilt, anxiety, and death as the seminal existential motifs--does not exclude a more positive vision of Existenz as revealed through transcendence. The limits do not provoke a discourse of radical finitude which skirts the edges of presence, but instead indirectly point toward a transcendent mystery, or the "encompassing" (19-2o). If there is an aspect of Jaspers's philosophy that remains inadequately addressed in either volume, it is his preoccupation with the role of tragedy in the post-war era? In light of the premier importance that Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger all grant to tragedy, Jaspers's passionate treatment of this topic in the context of the catastrophe of Western Europe merits far closer attention. Does not the issue of tragedy provide indispensable dues to chart the landscape of twentieth-century thought, and to amplify the differences which prevail in the portrait of politics as displayed by such diverse philosophers as Jaspers and Heidegger, Derrida and Levinas? FRANK SCHALOW DiUard University Norman Malcolm. Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View? Edited with a response by Peter Winch. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, a994. Pp. xi + 14o. Norman Malcolm at the outset of this, his posthumously published last book, focuses on the question: What did Wittgenstein mean when he said to his friend M. O'C. Drury, "I am not a religious man, but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view"? It was the right question. But Malcolm then--again on the first page of his book-proceeded to place restrictions on it, which were quite foreign to the spirit of Wittgenstein 's remark and which virtually crippled it. (1) He took Wittgenstein to be speaking of not social, psychological, or presumably even personal problems, but only of philosophical ones. (2) He chose to say that in Wittgenstein's later philosophy "there is not strictly a religious point of view, but something analogous to a religious point of view" (1, Malcolm's emphases). There is no reason to think that Wittgenstein would have accepted either of these restrictions on his remark. Nor does Peter Winch accept them in his forty-page discussion, which follows Malcolm's text in this book. In the upshot Malcolm finds "four analogies between Wittgenstein's conception of the grammar of language and his view of what is paramount in a religious life" (92). In both, he says, Wittgenstein emphasizes "an end to explanation," a sense of an "illness" pervading the human situation, "an inclination to be amazed at the existence of some ' Karl Jaspers, TragedyIs Not Enough, trans. Harald A. T. Reiche, Harry T. Moore, and Karl W. Deutsch (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952), 31-4O,93- io5_ BOOK REVIEWS 703 thing," and "doing, acting [having.] priority over intellectual understanding and reasoning " (92). But are such "analogies" really the crux of the "religious point of view" in terms of which Wittgenstein said that he could "not help seeing every problem"? When we recall that Wittgenstein's later philosophy was a proibund attack upon what he regarded as the idolatry of science, logic, and mathematics (an idolatry of which he himself, in the Tractatt~,, was partly guilty), and that he was also bent on undermining the accompanying subjectivized and privatized view of the human mind, as well as the scientistic reading of religious beliefs and primitive religions, we may be inclined to see his philosophy as clearing the way for the simple noninstitutionalized Tolstoian faith which he himself accepted. Philosophy and religion were on the same track in his mind (and not merely related by "analogies") when he wrote: "All that philosophy can do is to destroy idols. And that means not creating a new one--for instance, as in the 'absence of an idol' " (MS 213, 89). Peter Winch... (shrink)

In “Should We Impose Quotas? Evaluating the ‘Disparate Impact’ Argument Against Legalization of Assisted Suicide,” Ronald Lindsay argues that it should make no difference to the debate over legalizing assisted suicide whether the risks associated with legalization would fall disproportionately on the poor, people with disabilities, racial minorities, or any other especially vulnerable social group. Even assuming such an inequitable distribution of risks would occur, he maintains, attempting to avoid such an outcome is not a good reason to deny assisted (...) suicide to “competent persons who truly voluntarily choose it.”Those of us who worry that legalization will differentially burden already disadvantaged segments of society have generally taken it for granted that the possibility of such disparities raises significant public policy concerns. By insisting on an explanation of this assumption — and, in so doing, making explicit the tension between autonomy and equality that underlies the assisted suicide debate — Lindsay has significantly advanced the ongoing conversation. While I disagree with his analysis, I commend him for a thoughtful, provocative, and important contribution to the literature. (shrink)

‘Lapidem silicem tenebant iuraturi per Iouem, haec uerba dicentes: Si sciens fallo, tum me Dispiter salua urbe arceque bonis eiciat ut ego hunc lapidem.’ I do not propose to add to the mass of commentary and controversy which loads this passage of Paulus Diaconus , except to remind readers that it is a comparatively modern version of a very old formula. Under Dispiter lurks some early shape of the name of Iuppiter, certainly not of the Greek importation Dis, first worshipped (...) in Rome, apparently, in 505/249. I believe it to be older than the end of the regal period, probably much older, for it names the Arx as the important spot in Rome, not the Etruscanizing Capitol. However, this detail and my opinions concerning the oath and its takers matter little for my present purpose. It is enough if it be granted, as I think everyone will grant, that it is ‘eine alte Fetialformel’ as Fraenkel has it, at all events eine alte Formel, more ancient than the surviving literature. (shrink)

In hume's dialogues, Part x, Philo presents the trilemma attributed to epicurus: "is God willing but unable to prevent evil? able but unwilling? both willing and able? whence, Then is evil?" some critics say philo is trying to disprove god's existence. Some say he is not. I say he grants God exists as the first cause in order to show natural religion is impossible. For natural religion must establish god's benevolence, But it cannot combat "moderate scepticism" to establish any moral (...) attribute of god. It would have to show first that men are for the most part happy--A proposition no one can prove both because it is contrary to everyone's feeling and experience and because it is impossible to compute all the pains and pleasures of all men. Philo's argument stands independently of the more frequently discussed four causes argument of part xi. (shrink)

In 1973, Jim Hightower and his associates at the Agribusiness Accountability Project dropped a bombshell – Hard Tomatoes, Hard Times – on the land-grant college and agricultural science establishments. From the early 1970s until roughly 1990, Hightower-style criticism of and activism toward the public agricultural research system focused on a set of closely interrelated themes: the tendencies for the publicly supported research enterprise to be an unwarranted taxpayer subsidy of agribusiness, for agricultural research and extension to favor large farmers (...) and be disadvantageous for family farmers, for public research to stress mechanization while ignoring the concerns and interests of farm workers, and for the research and extension establishment to ignore rural poverty and other rural social problems. By 1990, however, there had been a quite fundamental restructuring of the agricultural technology opposition movement – one that is not often well recognized. Two overarching changes had occurred. First, agricultural-technology activism had shifted from contesting land-grant/public research priorities and practices to contesting private agribusiness technological priorities and practices. Second, the relatively integrated, overarching Hightower-type opposition had undergone bifurcation into two quite distinct social movements: the agricultural sustainability/local food systems movement on one hand, and the anti-GM food/crop and anti-food-system-globalization movement on the other. In this paper I explore the causes and consequences of these restructurings of the agricultural research and technology opposition movement. Chief among the major factors involved was the fact that “Hightowerism'' involved an ineffectual representational politics. Hightowerist claims – especially the claim that land-grant research was detrimental to family farmers – generated little support among the groups it claimed to represent (particularly “small'' or “family'' farmers). The two successor movements, by contrast, have relatively clear and dependable constituents. Further, the progressive molecularization of agricultural research, which proved to be both an antecedent and consequence of corporate involvement in agricultural research in the US, has decisively changed the issues that are contested by technology activists. Since the age of Hightower, the agricultural technology activist movement has shifted its 1970s and early 1980s emphasis from contesting public sector/land-grant research priorities to contesting private sector activities, particularly genetic engineering, GM crops, and globalization of agricultural technologies and regulatory practices. Even the sustainability/localism wing of the new agricultural technology movement configuration has progressively backed away from contesting public research priorities. The efforts of the sustainable agricultural and localism movement have increasingly focused on quasi-private efforts such as community supported agriculture, green/“value-added'' labeling and marketing strategies, and community food security. Some implications of this increasingly bifurcated, agricultural technology, activist movement configuration in which there is decreased interest in land-grant/public research priorities are discussed. (shrink)

In “Should We Impose Quotas? Evaluating the ‘Disparate Impact’ Argument Against Legalization of Assisted Suicide,” Ronald Lindsay argues that it should make no difference to the debate over legalizing assisted suicide whether the risks associated with legalization would fall disproportionately on the poor, people with disabilities, racial minorities, or any other especially vulnerable social group. Even assuming such an inequitable distribution of risks would occur, he maintains, attempting to avoid such an outcome is not a good reason to deny assisted (...) suicide to “competent persons who truly voluntarily choose it.”Those of us who worry that legalization will differentially burden already disadvantaged segments of society have generally taken it for granted that the possibility of such disparities raises significant public policy concerns. By insisting on an explanation of this assumption — and, in so doing, making explicit the tension between autonomy and equality that underlies the assisted suicide debate — Lindsay has significantly advanced the ongoing conversation. While I disagree with his analysis, I commend him for a thoughtful, provocative, and important contribution to the literature. (shrink)

This article revisits a widely accepted yet unsubstantiated trajectory of early Kufan Zaydi history, namely, that with ʿAlī recognized as the fourth rightly guided caliph by the proto-Sunni traditionists, represented by Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, the Batri traditionists were Sunnified. Analysis of Safīna’s hadith transmission and the transmitters of the first four caliphs’ virtues suggests that the four-caliphs thesis was likely circulated in Kufa by the late eighth century and that Kufan traditionists of various sectarian persuasions played an important role in (...) its formation. This paper argues that the Kufan Shiʿi traditionists came to identify with their tradition- ist townspeople as a result of shared qualities and mutual enemies. By revisiting a narrative that is often taken for granted, this study proffers new insights into the formation of a defining Sunni doctrine—the four-caliphs thesis—as well as the transformation of the Kufan Shiʿis. (shrink)

Standard defences of preservationism, and of the intrinsic value of nature more generally, are vulnerable to at least three objections. The first of these comes from social constructivism, the second from the claim that it is incoherent to argue that nature is both 'other' and something with which we can feel unity, whilst the third links defences of nature to authoritarian objectivism and dangerously misanthropic normative dichotomies which set pure nature against impure humanity. I argue that all these objections may (...) be answered by recasting the relationship between man and nature into a tripartite spectrum of ontological form between nature and artifact, with the key question being the extent to which nature has been humanised in accordance with certain modes of strongly instrumental rationality, these in turn being defined by reference to the split between abstract reason and natural feeling which was exacerbated by specific elements in the Enlightenment period. This new model may grant normative force by linking external nature to a broader conception of human psychological wellbeing than that offered by the quantitatively orientated models of human rationality and agency. (shrink)

In this paper we examine the theoretical foundations underlying the testing of quantum electrodynamics. We show that for the photon propagator (together with the contiguous vertices) it is not necessary to introduce ad hoc modifications in sufficiently accurate scattering experiments. Energy, momentum transfer, and accuracy determine the tested length in a model-independent way. The situation is quite different with the electron propagator. If gauge invariance is taken for granted, the electron propagator cannot be tested with processes where diagrams with open (...) electron lines are important in the lowest order of perturbation theory. These processes can only give limits for anomalous moment and multiphoton parts of the vertices. On the other hand, processes with closed electron loops (vacuum polarization), such as photon-photon and Delbrück scattering, as well as photon splitting or corresponding low-energy, high-precision experiments can give limits also for the electron propagator. But in these cases only less accurate limits can be obtained, which depend on the modification model. Hence testing of the electron propagator, i.e., roughly speaking, the Dirac equation, is much more difficult than testing of the photon propagator, i.e, Maxwell's equations. (shrink)

In their joint paper entitled The Replication of the Hard Problem of Consciousness in AI and BIO-AI (Boltuc et al. Replication of the hard problem of conscious in AI and Bio- AI: An early conceptual framework 2008), Nicholas and Piotr Boltuc suggest that machines could be equipped with phenomenal consciousness, which is subjective consciousness that satisfies Chalmer’s hard problem (We will abbreviate the hard problem of consciousness as H-consciousness ). The claim is that if we knew the inner workings of (...) phenomenal consciousness and could understand its’ precise operation, we could instantiate such consciousness in a machine. This claim, called the extra-strong AI thesis, is an important claim because if true it would demystify the privileged access problem of first-person consciousness and cast it as an empirical problem of science and not a fundamental question of philosophy. A core assumption of the extra-strong AI thesis is that there is no logical argument that precludes the implementation of H-consciousness in an organic or in-organic machine provided we understand its algorithm. Another way of framing this conclusion is that there is nothing special about H-consciousness as compared to any other process. That is, in the same way that we do not preclude a machine from implementing photosynthesis, we also do not preclude a machine from implementing H-consciousness. While one may be more difficult in practice, it is a problem of science and engineering, and no longer a philosophical question. I propose that Boltuc’s conclusion, while plausible and convincing, comes at a very high price; the argument given for his conclusion does not exclude any conceivable process from machine implementation. In short, if we make some assumptions about the equivalence of a rough notion of algorithm and then tie this to human understanding, all logical preconditions vanish and the argument grants that any process can be implemented in a machine. The purpose of this paper is to comment on the argument for his conclusion and offer additional properties of H-consciousness that can be used to make the conclusion falsifiable through scientific investigation rather than relying on the limits of human understanding. (shrink)

The consensus in the philosophical literature on joint action is that, sometimes at least, when agents intentionally jointly φ, this is explicable by their intending that they φ, for a period of time prior to their φ-ing. If this be granted, it poses a dilemma. For agents who so intend either severally or jointly intend that they φ. The first option is ruled out by two stipulations that we may consistently make: (i) that at least one of the agents non-akratically (...) believes that, all things considered, the agents ought not to φ, and (ii) that an agent is akratic, if she intends a thing that she believes, all things considered, ought not to be done. But the second option seems to entail the existence of a mental state with multiple subjects, which, in turn, seems to commit us to the existence of a group mind modified by that state: an incautious posit to say the least. I resolve the dilemma by noting that ‘They jointly intend’ is indeterminate between ‘They intend, jointly’, which does indeed entail that some mental state is an intention with multiple subjects, and ‘Jointly, they intend’, which entails a weaker claim, viz. that some mental state or states is an intention with multiple subjects. I then sketch an account of how a plurality of mental states, distributed among subjects, might, collectively, do service as their intention that they φ. It makes novel use of notions of participation and of doing a thing jointly with others. A corollary is that either intentions are not attitudes towards propositions, or propositions are individuated more finely than is often assumed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Oberlin's First Philosopher* EDWARD H. MADDEN ASA MAHANWAS THE FroST president of Oberlin College (1835-50) and professor of moral philosophy--the usual pattern during these years of "academic orthodoxy" when Christianity was purveyed in American colleges as the philosophy.1 The orthodox professors argued philosophical points very little but rather "presented" and "illustrated" their basic truths. 2 In some ways Mahan fit the stereotype. He did not always probe deeply into (...) questions or always offer reasons for his conclusions. His books are full of phrases like "it could not be otherwise", "no one, it is presumed, will deny that", "it is intuitively evident", "everyone cannot but know", and so on. And he frequently cited other philosophers, as well as the Scriptures, as "authorities." He even cited lengthy passages from Jonathan Edwards whenever he could, even though he differed with Edwards on almost every major point f In more important ways Mahan, however, does not fit the stereotype. Unlike Francis Wayland and most of the other academic orthodoxy before 1850, he had read, and been influenced by, German and French philosophers as well as the Scottish realists. Mahan was particularly influenced by Kant and Cousin. An astute contemporary reviewer remarked that Mahan, like Cousin, was an eclectic. "His eclecticism degenerates sometimes into the merely aggressive, and he delights occasionally in strange and incongruous combinations of Kant, Coleridge, Cousin and himself, but showing here and there great vigor and acuteness, and very considerable philosophical ability." a The aggressiveness of Mahan also sets him apart from the rest of the orthodoxy. He was too fiery by temperament to pass up polemics and hence got to the heart of some basic philosophical problems. He attacked the Edwardian doctrine of determinism and was led, by the vigor of his attack, into what many nineteenth-century Christians considered heresy3 He attacked utilitarianism in all its forms, including Paley's, in a far more consistent and thorough fashion than Francis Wayland and the other followers of Scottish realism and English intuitionism. And first and foremost he vigorously attacked the moral philosophy of his colleague Charles Grandison Finney, famous evangelist, professor of theology, and president-to-be of Oberlin. The spiritedness of his criticisms frequently aroused the ire of his Oberlin colleagues, but the spirited- *Research for some of the material in this paper was made possible by a grant from the Penrose Fund of the AmericanPhilosophicalSociety. ~Cf. Herbert W. Schneider, A History o] American Philosophy (2nd ed.; New York: Columbia University Press, 1963),pp. 195-220; and Joseph L. Blau, Men and Movements in American Philosophy (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952). 2Cf. E. H. Madden, "Francis Wayland and the Limits of Moral Responsibility," Proceedings o] the American Philosophical Bociety, Vol. 106 (1962),pp. 348-359. *Quoted by R. S. Fletcher in his History o] Oberlin College (Oberlin, Ohio, 1943),II, 701. 4Fletcher, I, 223-231. [57] 58 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY hess fortunately was accompanied by a "considerable philosophical ability" that merits close attention. I Mahan's critique of Edwards appears in his Doctrine o] the Will, first published in 1844. According to Mahan, "Edwards stands convicted of a fundamental error in philosophy, an error which gives form and character to his whole workmthe confounding of the Will with the Sensibility, and thus confounding the characteristics of the phenomena of the former faculty with those of the phenomena of the latter." 5 The trouble is that the whole of Edwards' work "is constructed without an appeal to Consciousness, the only proper and authoritative tribunal of appeal in the case." 8 If we attend carefully to consciousness, said Mahan, we can distinguish volition from the strongest desire and hence must distinguish between the separate faculties of will as personal activity and sensation as mere passive impression. The latter does not "act," it merely "suffers." The will is the moving force in life and unless it can be shown that there is some necessary connection between will and sensation--which, in fact, cannot be done--then it follows that the will is free, that is, the source of "personal activity." Mahan's rejection of universal determinism, of course, entailed the rejection of the Calvinistic doctrine of election... (shrink)

It is not obvious how one might reconcile Frege's claim that different numbers may not 'belong to the same thing' with his apparent identification of one pair with two boots, even if one grants his view of 'statements of number'. I suggest a way. It requires some revision of the semantic theory that is generally attributed to Frege.

In this paper I untangle a recent debate in the philosophy of epidemiology, focusing in particular on the Potential Outcomes Approach to causation. As the POA strategy includes the quantification of ‘contrary-to-fact’ outcomes, it is unsurprising that it has been likened to the counterfactual analysis of causation briefly proposed by David Hume, and later developed by David Lewis. However, I contend that this has led to much confusion. Miguel Hernan and Sarah Taubman have recently argued that meaningful causal inferences cannot (...) be drawn from obesity. This paper prompted Alex Broadbent to criticise the POA conception of causation, accusing two of the four theses its proponents are committed to, of circularity and falsity. Here I scrutinise Broadbent’s claims, and suggest that a Popperian approach to causal inference in epidemiology diffuses both of his objections. However, I move on to argue that the POA’s commitment to granting only manipulable conditions causal-status, renders the position implausible as a conceptual analysis of causation. That said, I conclude that the strategy the POA employs is an effective tool for effect-measurement in intervention-cases; if it is a conceptual analysis of causation at all, it must be restricted to the causal analysis of manipulable conditions. The POA’s failure to successfully demarcate causal from non-causal conditions simpliciter should therefore not be viewed as a serious threat. (shrink)

Inequality is the defining feature of our times. Many argue that it calls for a policy response, yet the most obvious policy responses require legislative action. And if inequality is the defining feature of our times, partisan acrimony and gridlock are the defining features of the legislature. That being so, it is worth considering what role administrative agencies, and administrative law, might play in ameliorating or exacerbating economic inequality. Here, I focus on American safety net programs, many of which are (...) joint operations between federal administrative agencies and state governments. In this context, a central mode of bureaucratic policy innovation comes in the form of administrative waivers, whereby a federal administrative agency waives some statutory requirement that is otherwise binding on state administrators. For example, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services recently granted waivers to allow several states to impose various “personal responsibility” requirements on Medicaid beneficiaries. Faced with a choice between legislative inactivity and policy innovation through waivers, many scholars and policymakers of both parties have tended to favor waivers. The appeal of waivers as a path around legislative gridlock is compelling. However, I argue that this view has neglected the federal structure of American safety net programs, and does not account for the state politics of implementation. Moreover, scholars have not focused on the severe information problems that federal agencies face when issuing waivers; a permissive waiver regime exacerbates these problems. Focusing on Medicaid implementation, I highlight the risks of waivers for American safety net programs. Before concluding, I discuss possible reforms to administrative procedures, and offer a case study of litigation surrounding one recent waiver application. The case study illustrates many of the theoretical arguments, and further demonstrates the failure of judicial review; it indicates how review might be adjusted to promote more effective use of waivers and diminish their perils. (shrink)

“Nay, I will go farther, and assert, that he could not so much as prove by any probable arguments, that the future must be conformable to the past. All probable arguments are built on the supposition, that there is this conformity betwixt the future and the past, and therefore can never prove it. This conformity is a matter of fact, and if it must be proved, will admit of no proof but from experience. But our experience in the past can (...) be a proof of nothing for the future, but upon a supposition, that there is a resemblance betwixt them. This therefore is a point, which can admit of no proof at all, and which we take for granted without any proof.”David Hume, Anof a Treatise of Human Nature p. 15In Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits Bertrand Russell recognizes and attempts to deal with what is one of the central questions of philosophy since Descartes, “The relation between individual experience and the general body of scientific knowledge.” He states that his purpose is “to discover the minimum principles required to justify scientific inferences.” The search for such principles arises from his belief that “data are private and individual.” He has only scorn for those who, “finding these problems distasteful” have “tried to deny that these problems exist.”. (shrink)

Brand criticizes Husserl’s remarks about motivation by saying that Husserl failed to analyse this phenomenon: "The fundamental nature of this phenomenon is claimed rather than demonstrated and not developed at all." It seems to me that this is the best way to criticize Brand’s own book on the mythological meaning of social processes. The basic character of such meaning is merely claimed rather than demonstrated. This singular lack of critical analysis vitiates whatever positive contributions Gesellschaft und persönliche Geschichte might have (...) made. Brand starts out with a critique of the theoretical attitude and of scientific objectivism and the corresponding objective world against which he poses the personal attitude and the personal-mythological lifeworld. His critique consists mainly in a presentation of some points of Husserl’s analysis and critique of objectivistic science. The correctness of Husserl’s assessment and critique of scientific research is taken for granted. It is presented in annoyingly general and vague terms. Brand gives hardly more than theses and titles. What strikes me most is the absence of attempts to explain, to argue, to demonstrate and to give direct evidence for Husserlian positions. In most cases we are offered mere "Andeutungen" of issues, questions, problems, and promised solutions. The philosophical style of parts one and two would likely appear unbearably dogmatic for British and American readers. Brand simply gives definitions, rather than lead the reader along his path of reasoning. Either you see the truth of a point made or you do not; he hardly attempts to help you to understand. In short, I do not think that parts one and two communicate anything worthwhile. It might still make sense to approach the sciences today the way Husserl did some forty years ago, however, it makes little sense to do it the way Brand does. He often presents for rebuttal positions which have long been overcome in Anglo-Saxon philosophy of science, even in German philosophy of science. This "isolationist" approach will cause readers to put the book aside after the first few pages. Part three is even more dogmatic. Most of the time Brand merely presents, in rather vague terms and generalities, the "results" of the research and analyses of others without even indicating factual evidence or reasonable arguments. His "arguments" usually consist in paraphrases and quotations from others, quotations which give conclusions of investigations, analyses, etc., which, without any indication of their supportive evidence, appear as unwarranted affirmations. Sometimes Brand is even content to give summaries of summaries of books of others. Occasionally Brand admits that all he has given so far is merely an indication or bare outline, and that a thorough analysis will have to provide the required evidence. However, only a chain of unwarranted claims and speculations about generalities follows; for example, Brand introduces a quote from Ricoeur by saying that Ricoeur "indicates" in it such and such, and then, in the next paragraph it turns out that the "thorough analysis" promised on the preceding page consists in nothing but that reference to Ricoeur. Brand’s book is one of those examples of "phenomenology" which discredits the phenomenological movement among serious philosophers and scientists by confusing phenomenology with that type of speculative philosophy against which phenomenology, with its maxim: "To the things themselves!," originally was conceived of as a counter-movement. A cardinal tenant of phenomenology is to avoid description without demonstrating the object. And this is, precisely, what Brand’s book does not avoid. He characterizes the mythological meaning of social processes throughout the book without such demonstration. Consequently, I think that Brand’s book harms rather than helps the phenomenological movement.—H. S. (shrink)

The question I shall consider is whether there are any mental causes, that is, whether there is anything which is both a state of mind and a cause of other mental or physical happenings. The obvious common-sense answer to this question is Yes. In ordinary discourse we constantly refer to human actions and experiences in what appears to be causal language; we seem to be saying that some states of mind are causes of other states of mind, and of some (...) bodily activities. Sometimes we do this by using the word ‘cause’ itself— ‘His driving into the ditch was caused by his seeing a child run into the road’, ‘The cause of his silence was his wish to protect his friend’. More often we use expressions which in physical contexts are admittedly causal— ‘A glimpse of the look on her face made him hesitate’, ‘Ambition was the driving force of his career’. Most philosophers have taken for granted the genuineness of these causal attributions. But recently it has been frequently denied that any state of mind can be properly described as the cause either of other states of mind or of physical occurrences, at any rate if by a state of mind one means a state of consciousness. Some philosophers who deny this are materialists, advocates of the Unity of Science. They believe that everything that happens in the universe can be causally accounted for by reference to a single set of fundamental laws, the laws of physics, and since a state of consciousness is not, as such, a physical state of any kind, it cannot have a place in the causal explanation of any event, and must be an epiphenomenon. Others are believers in an indeterminist interpretation of human freedom, and hold that o t introduce the category of cause and effect into the explanation of human actions is to deny that there is any genuine free will. I shall not be concerned with either of these general metaphysical objections, neither of which convinces me; but I shall consider some more specific objections to the admission of particular sorts of mental causes. (shrink)

The question I shall consider is whether there are any mental causes, that is, whether there is anything which is both a state of mind and a cause of other mental or physical happenings. The obvious common-sense answer to this question is Yes. In ordinary discourse we constantly refer to human actions and experiences in what appears to be causal language; we seem to be saying that some states of mind are causes of other states of mind, and of some (...) bodily activities. Sometimes we do this by using the word ‘cause’ itself— ‘His driving into the ditch was caused by his seeing a child run into the road’, ‘The cause of his silence was his wish to protect his friend’. More often we use expressions which in physical contexts are admittedly causal— ‘A glimpse of the look on her face made him hesitate’, ‘Ambition was the driving force of his career’. Most philosophers have taken for granted the genuineness of these causal attributions. But recently it has been frequently denied that any state of mind can be properly described as the cause either of other states of mind or of physical occurrences, at any rate if by a state of mind one means a state of consciousness. Some philosophers who deny this are materialists, advocates of the Unity of Science. They believe that everything that happens in the universe can be causally accounted for by reference to a single set of fundamental laws, the laws of physics, and since a state of consciousness is not, as such, a physical state of any kind, it cannot have a place in the causal explanation of any event, and must be an epiphenomenon. Others are believers in an indeterminist interpretation of human freedom, and hold that o t introduce the category of cause and effect into the explanation of human actions is to deny that there is any genuine free will. I shall not be concerned with either of these general metaphysical objections, neither of which convinces me; but I shall consider some more specific objections to the admission of particular sorts of mental causes. (shrink)

The recent Supreme Court decision upholding Roe v. Wade and in particular, the dissent by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, sheds new light on the issue of abortion. Let us consider any stage of a pregnancy when abortion is medically safe for the mother. If at that stage it is also medically viable to save the fetus, is an abortion performed at that stage of pregnancy morally justifiable? For example, if it is, or becomes, medically safe to perform abortions after first (...) trimester of pregnancy and at the same time saving a fetus is, or becomes, medically viable or not unusual during some stage of the second trimester, can abortions during and after that stage of pregnancy be justified? With a number of qualifications I shall argue the thesis that as a general rule, but not an absolute rule, abortion in these instances is not usually justifiable. For if it is, then one will also have to grant the moral justification for a number of other highly questionable medical practices. This thesis is not to be identified with the stronger claim that abortions of viable fetuses can never be performed. There are surely exceptions such as when the life or health of the mother is in danger. But, I shall argue, the justification for making such exceptions is on different grounds than is sometimes claimed because one must weigh the health of the mother against the life of another human being. (shrink)

This book is the product of a major British Academy Symposium held in 2007 to mark the centenary of the birth of H.L.A. Hart, the most important legal philosopher and one of the most important political philosophers of the twentieth century. -/- The book brings together contributions from seventeen of the world's foremost legal and political philosophers who explore the many subjects in which Hart produced influential work. Each essay engages in an original analysis of philosophical problems that were tackled (...) by Hart, some essays including extended critical discussions of his major works: The Concept of Law, Punishment and Responsibility, Causation in the Law and Law, Liberty and Morality. All the main topics of Hart's philosophical writings are featured: general jurisprudence and legal positivism; criminal responsibility and punishment; theories of rights; toleration and liberty; theories of justice; and causation in the law. (shrink)

Refusal of organ donation is common, and becoming more frequent. In Australia refusal by families occurred in 56% of cases in 1995 in New South Wales, and had risen to 82% in 1999, becoming the most important determinant of the country's very low organ donation rate .Leading causes of refusal, identified in many studies, include the lack of understanding by families of brain death and its implications, and subsequent reluctance to relegate the body to purely instrumental status. It is an (...) interesting paradox that surveys of the public continue to show considerable support for organ donation programmes—in theory we will, in practice we won't .In this paper we propose that the Australian community may, for good reason, distrust the concept of and criteria for “whole brain death”, and the equation of this new concept with death of the human being. We suggest that irreversible loss of circulation should be reinstated as the major defining characteristic of death, but that brain-dead, heart-beating entities remain suitable organ donors despite being alive by this criterion. This presents a major challenge to the “dead donor rule”, and would require review of current transplantation legislation. Brain dead entities are suitable donors because of irreversible loss of personhood, accurately and robustly defined by the current brain stem criteria."Even the dead are not terminally ill any more.". (shrink)

At 2.00 am on the morning of May 24, 1995 the Northern Territory Legislative Assembly Australia passed the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act by the narrow margin of 15 votes to 10. The act permits a terminally ill patient of sound mind and over the age of 18 years, and who is either in pain or suffering, or distress, to request a medical practitioner to assist the patient to terminate his or her life. Thus, Australia can lay claim to (...) being the first country in the world to legalise voluntary active euthanasia. The Northern Territory's act has prompted Australia-wide community reaction, particularly in South Australia, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory where proposals to legalise euthanasia have already been defeated on the floor of parliament. In New South Wales (NSW) the AIDS Council of NSW has prepared draft euthanasia legislation to be introduced into the Upper House as a Private Member's Bill some time in 1996. In this paper, we focus on a brief description of events as they occurred and on the arguments for and against the legalisation of euthanasia which have appeared in the media. (shrink)

Injury to the central or peripheral nervous system is often associated with persistent pain. After ischemic injury to the spinal cord, rats develop severe mechanical allodynia-like symptoms, expressed as a pain-like response to innocuous stimuli. In its short-lasting phase the allodynia can be relieved with the [gamma]-aminobutyric acid (GABA)-B receptor agonist baclofen, which also reverses the hyperexcitability of dorsal horn interneurons to mechanical stimuli. Furthermore, there is a reduction in GABA immunoreactivity in the dorsal horn of allodynic rats. Clinical neuropathic (...) pain of peripheral and central origin often cannot be relieved by opiates at doses that do not cause side effects. The loss of sensitivity to opiates may be associated with the up-regulation of endogenous antiopioid substances, such as the neuropeptide cholecystokinin (CCK). CCK and its receptor (CCK-R) protein is normally not detectable in rat dorsal root ganglion cells. After peripheral nerve section, both CCK and CCK-R are up-regulated in the dorsal root ganglia. Furthermore, CI 988, an antagonist of the CCK-B receptor, chronically coadministered with morphine, reduces autotomy, a behavior that may be a sign of neuropathic pain following peripheral nerve section. Thus, opiate insensitivity may be due to the release of CCK from injured primary afferents. Similarly, in the chronic phase of the spinal ischemic model of central pain, the allodynia-like symptom is not relieved by systemic morphine, but is significantly reversed by the CCK-B antagonist. Consequently, up-regulation of CCK and CCK-R in the CNS may also underlie opiate drug insensitivity following CNS injury. Thus, dysfunction of central inhibition involving GABA and endogenous opioids may be a factor underlying the development of sensory abnormalities and/or pain following injury to neural tissue. (shrink)